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THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TREATMENT OF  
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: DEFINING  
“RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW WITH BITE” 
Ian Bartrum* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, Nevada’s Democratic attorney general decided to stop 
defending the state’s constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, 
which is currently under review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.1 Perhaps even more surprising, Nevada’s Republican governor 
agreed with that decision, concluding that the “case is no longer defensible in 
court.”2 Ironically, all of this came after the plaintiffs had lost their case in 
the district court.3 But the federal constitutional landscape surrounding 
same-sex marriage is rapidly shifting, and in the nation’s largest circuit 
change is coming quickly indeed. The latest upheaval—the decision that in 
fact prompted Nevada’s about-face—is SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits peremptory strikes against gay jurors.4 The larger 
significance of SmithKline, however, is the court’s conclusion that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor requires it to apply 
heightened judicial scrutiny to equal protection claims based on sexual 
orientation.5 This is consistent with the court’s 2008 decision—in the wake 
of Lawrence v. Texas6—that applied heightened scrutiny to such claims 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to the 
editors of First Impressions for their hard work and guidance. 
 1. Sandra Chereb, Nevada Officials Won’t Defend Gay Marriage Ban, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Feb. 10, 2014, 10:21 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/nevada-ag-ends-fight-uphold-
gay-marriage-ban. The Nevada Constitution was amended in 2002 to provide that “[o]nly a 
marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in this state.” 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
 2. Chereb, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012). 
 4. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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brought under the Due Process Clause.7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has twice 
said what Justice Kennedy could not quite bring himself to say—that the 
Supreme Court exercises something more stringent than rational basis 
review in sexual orientation cases—and in doing so it perpetuated a split 
among the circuits that may eventually force the Court’s hand.8 
Similar doctrinal instability is emerging in the district courts. In 
December, Judge Shelby in Utah struck down the state’s Amendment 3—
which prohibited same-sex marriage—after applying strict scrutiny to the 
due process question and rational basis review to the equal protection 
claims.9 And just last month, Judge Wright Allen in the Eastern District of 
Virginia took the same approach in striking down that state’s statutory 
same-sex marriage ban.10 Meanwhile, Judge Kern of the Northern District of 
Oklahoma did not address the Due Process Clause but nonetheless 
invalidated his state’s constitutional prohibition for failing rational basis 
review under the Equal Protection Clause.11 Thus, district courts within the 
Fourth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that strict scrutiny applies to due 
process challenges to same-sex marriage bans,12 but these courts applied only 
rational basis to equal protection claims. All three judges, however, found 
that these bans failed to meet even the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. 
Conversely, both the First and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that 
rational basis review is still the standard under the Due Process Clause;13 but, 
again, the Ninth Circuit—far and away the nation’s largest—has ruled that 
some form of heightened scrutiny applies to both kinds of claims.14 All of 
this begs for some doctrinal clarity, and it seems likely that—despite their 
best efforts—the justices may face the same-sex marriage question again 
sooner rather than later. In the meantime, it is worth briefly exploring the 
Ninth Circuit’s effort to establish some guiding principles. 
 
 7. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
Lawrence required heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause). 
 8. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that Lawrence does 
not mandate strict scrutiny); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 9. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). 
 10. Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014). 
 11. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014). 
 12. It is important to note that these judges specifically found that same-sex marriage is 
a fundamental right but did not interpret Lawrence’s approach to sexual orientation per se. 
 13. Cook, 528 F.3d at 61; Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817. 
 14. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); Witt 
v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008). Another trial on this issue began on 
February 25, 2014, in federal district court in Detroit. Ed White, Michigan Gay-Marriage Ban 
at Stake in Rare Trial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2014, 5:05 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2-week-trial-begin-michs-gay-marriage-ban. 
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I. DUE PROCESS: WITT V. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
Major Margaret Witt had served in the U.S. Air Force for nineteen years 
and was just one year short of earning her pension when she was discharged 
for being gay.15 Prior to learning of her sexual orientation, the Air Force had 
in fact awarded Witt several medals and regularly featured her in its 
promotional and recruiting materials.16 The department’s attitude changed, 
however, after allegations surfaced that Witt was in a long-term relationship 
with another woman, and eventually a military tribunal concluded that she 
“had engaged in homosexual acts and had stated she was a homosexual” in 
violation of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (“DADT”) policy.17 The secretary of 
the Air Force ordered Witt honorably discharged, and she sued in the 
Western District of Washington challenging DADT as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause.18 The district court dismissed Witt’s suit for failing to state a 
claim, and she brought her appeal to the Ninth Circuit.19 
The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by noting that the doctrinal 
framework surrounding substantive due process had changed in 2003 with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas.20 In Lawrence, the Court 
struck down Texas’s statutory ban on gay sodomy for infringing on the 
individual “liberty” interest embedded in the concept of substantive due 
process.21 The Court did not, however, recognize a fundamental right to 
sexual intimacy or privacy, nor did it, at least explicitly, apply anything more 
stringent than rational basis review.22 Rather, Kennedy concluded as follows: 
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government. It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. 
 
 15. Witt, 527 F.3d at 809–10. 
 16. Id. at 809. 
 17. Id. at 810. The DADT policy was promulgated by the Department of Defense in 
accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2012)), and it was repealed 
by the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–321, 124 Stat. 3515 (effective 
Sept. 20, 2011). 
 18. Witt, 527 F.3d at 810. 
 19. Id. at 809. 
 20. Id. at 811. 
 21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65. 
 22. See id. at 578 (concluding that the law furthered “no legitimate state interest”). 
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The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.23 
The search for a “legitimate state interest,” of course, is characteristic of 
rational basis review, and so many commentators—as well as the First and 
Eleventh Circuits—concluded that Lawrence had applied only this most 
deferential standard.24 The Ninth Circuit, however, decided to reassess 
Lawrence by looking “at what the [Supreme] Court actually did, rather than 
dissecting isolated pieces of text.”25 
When it undertook this inquiry, three factors led the Ninth Circuit to 
conclude that Lawrence actually requires some sort of heightened scrutiny 
for due process claims based on sexual orientation.26 First, Lawrence 
explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, which had applied rational basis 
review to uphold Georgia’s prohibition on sodomy seventeen years earlier.27 
Yet the Lawrence Court did not second-guess Bowers’s particular application 
of the rational basis standard but concluded only that the earlier Court had 
“fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”28 Second, the cases 
that Lawrence relied on all engaged in some form of heightened scrutiny, 
and notably missing from the Court’s discussion was Romer v. Evans,29 an 
intervening case that applied rational basis review to a question involving 
sexual orientation.30 And finally, Lawrence highlighted the particular 
“intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” that Texas 
must “justify” in order to save its statute.31 Such a particularized justification 
is not typically necessary under rational basis review, where “regardless of 
the liberty involved, any hypothetical rationale for the law [will] do.”32 
With this issue decided, the Ninth Circuit set about establishing the 
criteria for a new, slightly heightened form of judicial scrutiny—in essence, 
the court attempted to delineate the contours of what commentators have 
 
 23. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 24. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 25. Witt, 527 F.3d at 816 (emphasis in original). 
 26. Id. at 816–18. 
 27. Id. at 817 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 28. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). 
 29. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 30. Witt, 527 F.3d at 817 (finding that the Court relied on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Carey v. Population Services, 
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), but not on Romer). 
 31. Id. at 814 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
 32. Id. at 817. 
 
 
 
 
146 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 112:142 
 
 
for years labeled “rational basis review with bite.”33 For guidance, the court 
turned to another 2003 Supreme Court decision—Sell v. United States—
which considered whether the government can forcibly medicate mentally ill 
defendants to render them competent for trial.34 There, the Supreme Court 
balanced the defendant’s “significant” liberty interest in declining drugs 
against the state’s “legitimate” and “important” interest in reducing the 
dangers an inmate presents to himself and others.35 The Ninth Circuit 
suggested that this type of review is similar to the so-called intermediate 
scrutiny generally applied in gender discrimination cases36 and identified 
three relevant considerations: 
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at 
stake. . . . Second, the court must conclude that [the state’s action] will 
significantly further the concomitant state interests. . . . Third, the court 
must conclude that [the state’s action] is necessary to further those 
interests. The Court must find that any alternative, less intrusive [actions] 
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. . . .37 
The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case for findings relevant to this 
heightened standard,38 and the district court concluded that, in the particular 
case of Witt, DADT failed to pass constitutional muster.39 
By reading Lawrence holistically, then, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
due process claims based on sexual orientation deserve heightened judicial 
scrutiny; and by tacking on Sell, the court set out the specific standards that 
this review entails. In so doing, the court both acknowledged what most 
observers have known for years—that there is a different rational basis 
review at work in sexual-orientation cases—and endeavored to bring some 
clarity to the doctrine in this area. But the Ninth Circuit did not extend its 
holding to equal protection cases, which the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Lawrence had done nothing to change. 
 
 33. This may have begun with Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1972) 
(assessing the difference between traditional rational basis review and newer, more stringent 
applications). 
 34. Witt, 527 F.3d at 818 (citing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003)). 
 35. Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 178). 
 36. Id. at 818 n.7 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
 37. Id. at 818–19 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81). 
 38. Id. at 822. 
 39. Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION: SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP. V. ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES 
Equal protection doctrine did change last summer, however, with the 
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in United States v. Windsor.40 Writing for the 
majority, Kennedy proceeded very much as he had in Lawrence: he again 
declined to specify the level of scrutiny at work and again concluded that the 
government had failed to “justify [DOMA’s] disparate treatment” of same-
sex couples.41 Moreover, Kennedy similarly identified the “liberty of the 
person protected by the Fifth Amendment” as the constitutional right at 
stake, a protection made only more robust by the reverse incorporation of 
the Equal Protection Clause: “While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws 
from Government the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, 
the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that 
Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood 
and preserved.”42 Unlike in Lawrence, the Court did rely on several cases that 
explicitly applied rational basis review—the kind “with bite”—to strike down 
laws under the Equal Protection Clause,43 but in the end it scrutinized 
DOMA in very much the same way it had Texas’s antisodomy statute in 
2003.44 
The Ninth Circuit did not have to wait long to apply Windsor’s equal 
protection guidance in the same way it had Lawrence’s due process guidance. 
That opportunity came in a lawsuit between two pharmaceutical 
companies—GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and Abbott Laboratories—that was 
filed in the Northern District of California.45 The dispute centered on a 
licensing agreement between the two corporations regarding an HIV 
treatment drug.46 GSK claimed that Abbott had sold it a license to market the 
drug and then—after Abbott developed a newer product—increased the 
price of the licensed drug fourfold to boost its competitive advantage.47 The 
increasing price of HIV medications had garnered significant attention in 
the gay community, and during jury selection Abbott used its first 
 
 40. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 41. Id. at 2693. 
 42. Id. at 2695. 
 43. See id. at 2693 (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973), and 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
 44. It is certainly worth noting that Windsor also relied on federalism concerns and the 
states’ traditional role in regulating marriage, id. at 2692–94, but the ultimate approach to the 
equal protection claim remains quite similar to that taken in Lawrence. 
 45. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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peremptory strike to remove the only self-identified gay person in the jury 
pool.48 GSK challenged the strike as a violation of Batson v. Kentucky,49 
which prohibits peremptory strikes made on the basis of race.50 The district 
court denied the challenge, and GSK appealed to the Ninth Circuit.51 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the “central question” in the 
case—whether Batson applies to strikes made against gay jurors—turned on 
whether “classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to a standard 
higher than rational basis review.”52 That question, in turn, required the 
court to interpret the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor.53 
Judge Reinhardt conceded that Windsor had not explicitly announced the 
appropriate standard of review but then quickly invoked Witt to explain the 
approach he would take: “When the Supreme Court has refrained from 
identifying its method of analysis, we have analyzed the Supreme Court 
precedent ‘by considering what the Court actually did, rather than by 
dissecting isolated pieces of text.’ ”54 Reinhardt then looked to the three 
factors identified in Witt to determine whether Windsor employed a 
heightened level of scrutiny.55 
First, Reinhardt pointed out that, as in Lawrence, the Windsor Court did 
not consider “possible” or “conceivable” post-hoc rationalizations for the 
challenged law, which is the normal practice under rational basis review.56 
Rather, the Supreme Court inquired into DOMA’s “design, purpose, and 
effect” and carefully examined the available legislative history to determine 
Congress’s actual motivations.57 Second, like Lawrence, the Windsor Court 
asked whether a legitimate purpose might “justify” DOMA’s disparate 
treatment of gay couples.58 Reinhardt explained that, when applying rational 
basis review, the Court is typically “unconcerned with the inequality that 
results from the challenged state action,” but in Windsor Kennedy was 
deeply troubled by the indignity that DOMA visited on same-sex couples—
in effect treating them as second-class citizens.59 Finally, Reinhardt observed 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 50. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 475. 
 51. Id. at 474. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 480. 
 54. Id. (quoting Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 55. Id. at 480–81. 
 56. Id. at 481. 
 57. Id. at 481–82 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013)). 
 58. Id. at 482. 
 59. Id. 
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that, as was true in Lawrence, the Supreme Court in Windsor relied heavily 
on heightened-review cases.60 With these three factors in mind, the Ninth 
Circuit reached an unequivocal conclusion: 
In sum, Windsor requires that we reexamine our prior precedents, and Witt 
tells us how to interpret Windsor. Under that analysis, we are required by 
Windsor to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual 
orientation for purposes of equal protection. Lawrence previously reached 
the same conclusion for purposes of due process. Thus, there can no longer 
be any question that gays and lesbians are no longer a group or class of 
individuals normally subject to rational basis review.61 
In the context of jury strikes, this conclusion was critically important 
because the Supreme Court has permitted the use of “peremptory challenges 
to remove from the venire any group or class of individuals normally subject 
to ‘rational basis’ review.”62 All that was left for the Ninth Circuit to decide, 
then, was whether the application of heightened scrutiny was “sufficient”—
or “merely necessary”—to find an equal protection violation.63 Relying on 
J.E.B v. Alabama, which extended Batson to challenges based on gender, 
Reinhardt identified two guiding factors: (1) whether the relevant class has 
“a history of exclusion from jury service”; and (2) whether that class has 
suffered “the prevalence of invidious group stereotypes.”64 Because the court 
was able to conclude—fairly easily—that gays and lesbians met both these 
criteria, it held that Abbott’s use of the peremptory strike was 
unconstitutional.65 Perhaps more importantly, the decision extended the 
rationale of Witt so that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, heightened judicial 
scrutiny now applies to both due process and equal protection claims 
brought on the basis of sexual orientation. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Ninth Circuit handed down Witt, President Obama and 
then–Solicitor General Kagan declined to take an appeal to the Supreme 
Court.66 At the time, it seemed that most advocates of DADT believed that 
the administration made that decision because it was afraid the Supreme 
 
 60. Id. at 483. 
 61. Id. at 484. 
 62. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 141, 143 (1994). 
 63. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484. 
 64. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 489. 
 66. Jess Bravin & Laura Meckler, Obama Avoids Test on Gays in Military, WALL ST. J. 
(May 19, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124268952606832391. 
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Court would reverse the Ninth Circuit.67 If that fear was perhaps well-
founded in 2009, it is certainly less so now. In the wake of SmithKline and 
the district court cases discussed above, opponents of federal constitutional 
protection for gay people and same-sex couples must feel much less 
confident in their position. Circuit courts are now deeply split on the issue, 
and the prevailing winds are blowing west. The Ninth Circuit has not only 
made explicit what every reasonable observer already knew—that Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor each applied something more searching than 
traditional rational basis review—but it has also provided a standard with 
which to analyze sexual-orientation cases moving forward. To paraphrase 
the court, to justify intrusions into sexual privacy or disparate treatment of 
gay people, the state must demonstrate (1) that its actions are necessary to 
significantly further an important governmental interest; and (2) that no less 
burdensome approach is likely to achieve the same results. This seems like 
an eminently sensible test, and it is one that the justices would do well to 
adopt when this question inevitably makes its way back onto their docket. 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., Ed Whelan, SG Kagan’s Subversion of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Law, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE BENCH MEMOS (May 19, 2009, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/50138/sg-kagans-subversion-dont-ask-dont-
tell-law/ed-whelan. 
